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iated,~asmuch as 'the complaint filed against him in the justice'~
poli'rt' ~~. neither an indi~tment nor an in~o~ation.·It.~ay

i:

.

.

:PEOPLE tJ. GODLEWSKI

hethat.-,he is entitled to 'Invoke the eonstitutIOnal proVISIOn
indf'lp,end~ntly of any statute, (see Harris v. Municipal Court,
-SUPfa-),put as we have.seen, he falls squarely within the pro~
,yisions. ,.of ,section 1381,.' relating to. the .trial .. of. defendants
c~~finedin a state.prison. He made no demand as.there reo
quired;.! [9] We find nothing unreasonable in the requireinent:lor a demand. It does not abrogate the COIl:stitutional
guarantee.. It is .merely regulatory of it.' Persons already
incarcerated in prison will not. suffer imprisonment during
'.
.
delay. '.
. [10] Appellant Taranski contends the evidence' is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction against him. On
March 11, 1941, the State Department of Motor Vehicles had
a safe. in its· office' in Pasadena containing over $400 in cash
and some checks. It was locked by an employee when. she
ieft work shortly after 5 p. m. on that day~ A few minutes
before midnight that night it was discovered that the rear
door of the office had been broken open and the safe removed.
There were marks on' the ·office floor from dragging the safe.
'rhe safe was discovered about four miles from its original
location with its door. having been forceably removed. The
checks it contained and its door were lying on .the ground
near the safe. The cash was not found. Some time later an
automobile registered in appellant Godlewski's name was
~ound in Nevada. The imprint of· its tires' was the same as
marks found at the rear of the office which was burglarized.
Godlewski was residing in an apartment in Los Angeles until
Ii few days prior to March 11, 1941, the date of the burglary,
and was frequently visited by appellant Taranski. The latter
was seen in the office of the department several days prior to.
the time of the crime. Godlewski was seen walking along
the street in the vicinity of the office the evening of the crime.
The metal strip on the sill of the car door .contained paint
identified as the same as that on the safe. Godlewski and
Taranski were together and were arrested in Fresno five days
after the day of the crime. Taranski was carrying a suit case
containing a pinch bar, a cold chisel, a hacksaw, a sledge
hammer and flashlight. The chisel and pinch bar contained'
r.emnants .of the fire elay used as innulation in the safe and
marks on the safe indicated that they had been made'by the
bar. .Taraaski
denied and Jater ./:ldchisel
. and pinch
.
. . . \.. first
. .
mined to 1.hP. ul'ficers lie ba·J. lived In Los ,Angeles. When
'.,

"
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COUNTY
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asked why he denied he had b.eenthere .he ,i'~pliedi:r.ii'!W"Cllt - ..
what would you do Y" At the tIme of theIr arrest 'both ,appe1~
lants were carrying pistols. Neither· of th~"appe~a'l1tsqtesti- ,

'fie~~o:JI~::::~s·~~::::~~e~~ain·ihe· .~o~~~t~~~~~i:~ra¥~'

ski. [11] Assuming, as argued by TaraIiskii:~~t:~~I~~s~s~
sion by defendant of burglar to~ls sho~y ,~f~,~~}~~". 'C?~~j"
sion or the .crime, like ~he possessIon' of stol~n\:~~,~P·~~i;s,~arl.4<
ing alone IS not suffiCIent to prove the ~eI?nd~~~ l~rt .of
the offeIiseof burglary, when that'~acto~ IS:C~~p~~~;,,~t~,
other circumstances such as ar,e present.In t~ei,~~ta~k~ase,
there' is sufficient evidence. :. That. is .especiallyt~,e J\'Ype~~ the
defendant has failed toaccolint fo~ the possession ,:up~n a
theory inconsistent with his guilt of the offense,ch,!-rged.~)~ge~
People v.Parkinson, 138 Cal.App. 599 [asP.2d.f8];-=,P~pple
v. Russell, 120 Cal.App. 62.2 [8P.2d 209] ; PeopZe:v.GpZembiewski, 25 Cal.App.2d 115 [76 P.2d 717] ;PeopZ~·v.SJ"aw,
46 Cal.App.2d .768 [117 P.2d 34] ; People. v;Ell~s,·.33·iCal.
App.2d 616 [92 P.2d 431].)
The judgment is affirmed.
"J

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Traynor,'J.,·andS~auer,
j., concurred.
.
.
. '. ",'1:
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was dwed '.A~~~26,
1943.
. .... ".

) , " ,\
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[So F. No. 16932. In Bank. Aug. 10,1943.)·'

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCOet.al.;;~eii
tioners,v. HAROLD J. ~OrD, as Controllerjetc.,
Respondent.
[1] Municipal Corporations-Contracts-Wages-CompensatiOD: in
Accordance with Prevailing Rates.--:Sa.n Francisco CitY:9?·~T;
ter, § 151,declaring that the comp~nsat1ons fl.xed for ¥lutll~lpii1
employees "shall be in accor~ WIth .the ge~~rally p~~~lI:ih~g
rates of wages for like servICe and workmg condltI?~,1;J m
licK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Municipal Corporatio~s,l3.3~.L
[2] MUnICIpal Corporations, §§ 330, 340;; [4], .Municipa1Corp~o:r
tions, § 232; [5, 7] Courts, §l9; [6] ActlOns, § 25.

../
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private employment or in other comparable governmental
organizations in this state," does not require that the wages
be identical with or not higher than the generally 'prevailing
rates, but rather that there be a reasonable or. just c'orrespondence'between the rates established and those elsewhere
prevailing, i.e., that they be in harmony with and substantially conform to such other rates.
[2] ld.-Oontracts-Wages: Review by Oourts.-A determination
whether proposed rates of compensation for municipal employees are in accord or in harmony with generally prevailing
rates is within the discretion of the rate-making authority.
The courts will not interfere with that determination unless
so palpably unreasonable and arbithe act is fraudulent
trary as to indicate an abuse of discretion as' a matter of law.
[3: ld.-OontractIl-:-Wage~Procedure in Formulating Schedule'
of Rates of Oompensation.-;-San Francisco City Charter, § 151,
prescribing the procedurE! for formulating a proposed schedule of compensation for municipal employees, was substantially complied. with where the Civil .Service Commission
proceeded in conformity with said, section in investigating
wages paid in private employment, except that it did not set
forth in its official records all of the data' obtained or make
findings as to the generally prevailing rates, but where it did
set forth a summary 6f wage recommendations and supporting
data which listed the.present rate paid, the prevailing union
wages, and the appropriate prevailing wage for all such employees.

or

(4] ld.-OrdinaJl,ces-ValiditY.,-Necessity for Observance of Mandatory Prerequisites.-An ordinance is invalid if the manda-

tory prerequisites to its enactment are not substantially observed. Where, however, no attack is made on the procedure
followed by the municipal board in adopting rates' of wages
for certain municipal employees as recommended by the Civil
Service Comniissi~n, and where. there was. substantial compliance by the commission with the procedural steps' governing its action, there isna necessity for a judicial determination whether the validity of an ordinance adopting said
rates .could be affected by irregularities or defects in the
procedure follcwed by the cOllilriission.
[5a,5bl Oourts-Jnrisdiction-Necessity for Actnal Oontroversy.
-;-The doctrine that an action not founded upon an actual
controversy is collusive and will not be entertained does not
apply to a m~ndamus proceeding to compel a municipal controller to audIt and approve wage claims of municipal railway
f2] See 18 Oal.Jur. 999.
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employees, where the controller's right to approve said claims
has been challenged in a taxpayer's suit, where the taxpayer
has filed a brief "as a friend of the court," although he with~
drew his petition for leave to intervene, where the. c?ntroller's
right to approve the claims depends upon the vahdIty of the
ordinances authorizing the compensation, and where the de,
termination of this question involves a construction of the city
charter and the application of its provisions to .the. facts of
the case. In such a situation, a real controversy eXIsts;as to
the controller's duties in the p r e m i s e s . .
[6] Actions-Right of Action-Fictitious Actions.-A ~uit is not
condemned by law merely because it is friendly.
[7] Oourts-Jurisdiction-'-Necessity for Actual' Oontroversy.....
Effect of Payment of Oounsel Fees by One Party~-Wl:tere the
adversary parties to a proceeding are a mnni9ipal cprporation,
and one of its officers, the fact that the, fees, ~f ~onnseL ~Ql;
both sides ultimately must be paid fi'ompublici ,funds !does
not render the proceeding collusive" in . the :a}'is.¥~ceof ,a!1Y
showing that the governing board of the mUnlcIpahty selected
counsel for the officer or exercised control ovel':the t>reparation or presentation of the case on his behalf. ' :
".
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel a municipal con~
troller to audit and approve wage claims ofm~cipal railway.
employees. Writ granted.
.'
'~".,
;

",.o:,'\V

,.~. '~,'

"('

j)"~,~;:~£'4t

John J. O'Toole, City Attorney, and Walter 'A. Dqld, Chief"
Deputy City Attorney, for Petitioners.·
'"
•

•

.'

'.'!.~

.".

•

,::'

!.

.~ '1.~,d ~.' i';,: '

Jesse H. Steinhart, John J. Goldberg 'and S;, ,A. iLadar,fot;
R e s p o n d e n t . · i', Ii ( ,,:ff
I

Leo R. Friedman as AmicuS Curiae o~· ~~~~~(~"fl'~~~~~Th1
d e n t . ' '. ,\.,'"t .. ,i"<.i7Li',i:ll:':'
GIBSON, C.J.-By thi~ proceedi~~ iii:Ui~'fJ:a~h!~~~~~~'#!ffl
,arid county of San Franclsco and ltS, .Pu~hc, .ut~!~~l,~~(;~~~;.
mission seek to compel respondent, as contr611er.,of ~th,e,~l~:
and county, to audit and approve' wage claims. 'of'cert~rn:
motormen, conductors! ~treetc~r operators an~ bus Op~;~~?,~~
employed by the mUnIclpal rallway at the rate-soi: compensa:'
tion fixed in the Salary Standardization ,Ordinance. (Oral-,
nance # 2184), effective July 1, 1943, 'and 'in' the Ap~~~

[6] See 1 Oa1.Jnr. 335; 1 Am.Jur. 416.,
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Salary Ordinance for the year 1943-1944 (Ordinance # 2148),
also effective July 1, 1943. In support of his refusal to audit
and draw, warrants for these claims, the respondent contends
that. their payment would constitute an illegal expenditure
of public funds for the reilBon that the cited ordInances are
void as being in contravention of section 151 of the city
charter.
, So far as presently material, section 151, by virtue of an
amendment effective January 11, 1943, provides:
"The board of supervisors shall have power and it shall
be its duty' to fix by ordinance from time' to' time, . . • all
salaries, wages and compei:rsations . . . for the positions, or
places -of employment, of all officers and employees of all
departments,' offices; boards 'and 'commissions of the city and
county ;in all' cases where such compensations are paid by
the city and county....
"In fixing schedules of compensation as in this section
provided, the ,civil service commission shall prepare and submit to the boa,rd of supervisors and the ,board shall adopt a
schedule of compensations which shall include all classifications, positions and places of employment the wages or salaries for which are subject to the provisions of this section;
.'. . The compensations fixed as herein provided shall be in
accord with the generally prevailing rates of wages for like
service and working conditions in private employment or in
other comparable governmental organizations in this state;

"

, I'

, ?

The Annu.al ,Salary Ordinance for the fiscal year just expired (1942~1943) had provided rates of compensation for
motormen, conductors and bus operators ranging from 80c
to 871hc, an hour depending on .the type of work and the
,
length of service.
Between January 15 and March 2, 1943, pursuant to th~'
provisions of section 151 of the charter, the Civil Service
Commission conducted a comprehensive investigation and by
such survey obtained facts and data concerning wages paid
to motormen, conductors, streetcar operators and bus operators for like service and working conditions in private employment and in other governmental organizations in this
state. This survey extended to the rates of wages paid such
employees in fourteen communities by some nineteen transportation systems or their branches, representing all of the
street railway systems and comparable bus lines in the state.
A schedule of the data thuS considered by the commission

Bon
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discloses rates of pay ranging from 7o'cici'~3%.~!,~#~,~~~:::·tt,
appears, however, that only operatqrs: ()fotlef!ti~ c!l~, ~¥~
bus drivers;' received in excess of ,~71h~ .~:~~Uf· "B.~e,~:'i?~
such, data, aJ?don cha~~ed econo~~c c~n~~~l?~ ;,r~~~~g~~ ,
an increased cost of hvmg,' the commlSslon,,;as, TeqU1r~.by "
the charter after several public hearings, ',wlll&hi all'm~t '
ested, persoils, were,heard,' published, its 'P!~p:o~~~:',~c;~~~~~',9~
rates 'of wage '~iuiging fr~ni. 85c to 9~%c:;ail}i~~t~~~~~~~~ ,
with Ii <lOmp~mson of eXlstmgschedliles:;. T!i~,¥e8!~~~:J~C1'
also as required by the charter), th~' comm~S?-~~~~~~l~e~
the schedule to,the boar.d of;~upenTJ.s~rs ~t~,.~,!'?-~~;t,,8!
the facts and data obtamed aI).d conSldere!1~i~r~rl.f~:f~:c:~r#;
:r;ne:nding the proposed ra~es~i"
,,',', "":i':,,";;-..::: f,~,,;
Fo~lowing ,many hearmgs th~" board~f ;~J,lpe,~~r~r'~~p,~;
proved ,and adopted ~h~ rates of :vage as recomm,en,ded by ~he
Civil Service CommISSIon exceptmg only the rates proposed
for bus operators. As to the latter, class the boa!d, under
,.
authority of the charter, amended the schedule proposed by
the commission, and fixed the rates of pay at, 5c an hour
hiO'her, the maximum rate being 971hcan hour; Thus, the
bo~rd ~f supervisors in thereafter adopting the S~lary' Stand~
ardization Ordinance and the Annual Salary Ordmance, fixed
rates of wages for motormen, conductors, streetcar operators'
and bus operators, ranging from 85c to 971hcan hOur. , .'
[1] Respondent's principal contention is thatt,hese ordinances are invalid for the reason tha~ the board" of, super~
visors in fixing the rates e:X;Cleeded" the authOr:ity"granted t,~
it by section 151 of the ch~rter. Whil~,,~onced~g tha~' ~~
"
fixing of rates of compensatIOn fOr,lI1unlclpalem~loyees is;a
legislative, function (citing to that 'effect,
IJ.'tego, ",!,a!~~
Co. v. San Diego, 118 Cal. 556[50 P; .63,3,~?,Am,;~t.iReI>."g61;
38 L.RA. 460] ; Contra Costa Wa'ter Co.!. OakUl~fl~ 15~"CIl~~
323, 335 [113P. 668]; Smyth v,. 'Ame8,)69,¥~~::4~~:J~~
s.m. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819]), respond?nt conteno/!. ~~at.~he pow,et
of the board of superVIsors m thIS respect IS subJect to the
charter limitation that the compensationsfixed'''shalI be hi
accord with the generally prevailing rates of. wages for like,
service and working conditions in private employment orin
other comparable govern~e~.t.al org~nizationsJ~ th~s st,at.e,"
and that the power of the CIVll ServIce CommiSslOn.ls sUl>~~~t
to the limitation that the rates recommended by It be ' Itl
accordance" :with the prevailing rates ofcom.p~nsation.He
argues that since the rates fixed in the or~nances exceed to

at
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the extent above noted the maximum,rates paid elsewhere in
this state to like employees for comparable work they are not
"in accord with" or " ill accordance" with the generally
prevailing rates. In other words, respondent contends that
the quoted phrases as used in the charter mean not higher
than the prevailing rates of wages.
'
In our opinion, the phrases do not require that the rates
of wages recommended by the commission or fixed by the
board. ?e identical with, or not higher than the generally
prevaIlIng rates, but rather that there be a reasonable or
just correspondence between the rates established and those
elsewhere prevailing, i.e., that they be in harmony with and
substantially conform to such other rates. (See Webster's
Int'l. Dictionary; The Oxford English Dictionary; Roget's
Thesaurus.) The word "accordance" is defined in Webster
supra; and in Black's Law Dictionary to mean in "agree~
ment; harmony; concord; conformity." It should be noted
that prior to its amendment in January 1943 section 151
provided that the rates of compensation fixed ;'shall be not
h~g.her ~~an prevailing rates for like service and working condItIons.
The amendment deleted that express limitation.
[~] The .determinatio~ whether proposed' rates of compensa,bon a;e I~ a.ccord or. In harmony with generally prevailing
rates IS wIth~n the ~hscretion ~f thE) rate-making authority.
The courts WIll not Interfere WIth that determination unless
the action is fraudulent or, so palpably unreasonable and
arbitrary as to' indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of
law. (See Hannon v. Madden, 214 Cal. 251, 257 (5 P. 2d 4] ;
see, also, Mann v. Tracy, 1~5 Cal. 272 (196 P. 484]; In re Oity
and Oountyof San FrancMCO, 191 Cal. 172 184 [215 P 549].
McQuillin, Municipal Oorporations, 2d ed:, sec. 535, p: 801.)
Resp.ondent concedes that this court is not required to
determIne the generally prevailing rates of compensation and
admits that a writ of ma:t;ldamus, should issue unless it is conclUded "that upon no conceivable basis under all of the evi~eIl;ce '... ~~n therat.es as.fixedbe brought within the charter
llI~l.l:atIon. The eVIdence discloses that, the generally prevaIlIng rates of compensation 'are somewhere between 70cand
98%c an hour, the, minimum and maximum rates paid by
other, transportation systems in the state. Under the facts
of the present case we are not prepared to hold that the
board of supervisors abused its authority to fix rates "in
accord with" or i~ harmony with the generally prevailing
rates of compensatIOn.

Aug. 1943]
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,[3] Respondent also contends that the ordiIil:lUces, l,U'e,
invalid for the reason that the Civil Service Oommission failed
to comply with certain requirements of section 151 of the
charter prescribing the procedure to be followep. Jnfo~ulat
ing a proposed schedule of rates of compensatlOn"cThIs;pro~
cedure is outlined in the following portion of section, 151.:, .'
"The proposed' schedules of compensation or any"a~end~
ments thereto shall be recommended by the civil service com~
mission solely on the basis of facts and data obtained "in a
comprehensive investigation and survey concerning wages
paid in private employment for like service and working conditions or in other governmental organizations in this state~
The commission shall set forth in the official recordsofits proceedings all of the data thus obtained and on the basis of such
data the commission shall set forth in its official records an
order making its findings as to what is the generally prevailing rate of pay for each class of employment in the municipal service as herein provided, and shall recommend a rate of
pay for each such classification in accordance t~erewith. The
proposed schedules of compensation recommended by the
civil service commission shall be transmitted to the board
of supervisors together with a compilation of a suminary of
the data obtained and considered by theci:vilservice com.
mission and a comparison showing existing schedules~. Before
being presented' to the board of superv~ors. forconsid.eration,
the proposed schedulesanda comparison with e~ting schedules shall be published once a week for two weeks~" ••. " ,,;~, ,,' '
, It is agreed that the commission proceeded in conforpritY,
with the requirements of the foregoing, chartersect~onexcept
it is claimed that it did not' set forth in the: official' reco~ds
of its proceedings all of the dataobtained,in)ts':;i~yestig;a;
tion, nor did it set forth an,ordermaking;jtst~~~~~i~~f;~R
the generally prevailing rates. As before,:stat~~i!he;~(!~:tn~lP~f
sionmade a survey of the rate~ol.w~g~j)aid :~}c~~d»:9~P:~,
mQtormen and bus operators, In allstreetcal'r(a;t~~:'.J)Whli~~
operations of all street railway systems. and,co~parlible .. b~
lines in the State of California. InforlnulatfugHst,.r~co~l'
m:endations to the board of .supervisors the commission: h~4
before it and considered all the facts collected in such· ~u~ey,
Not all of this data was set forth.in its officia1iecprp:s; ~~~
it did set forth therein a Summary of WageR,ecommendaf
tions and Supporting Data. This. summary liste~~,8.D,l()~g.,pth~f
things the present rate paid by the municipal, railway,".th~ .
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prevailing union wages, and the appropriate' prevailing' wage
for all such designated employees. These schedules reflected
the findings of the commission with' respect to prevailing
wages and constituted a substantial compliance by the Civil
Service ,Commission with the procedural steps enumerated in
section 151. Moreover, the charter section provides that" The
board of supervisors may approve, amend or reject the sched~
ule ofcomp{lnsations proposed by the civil servicecommission." Thus it is clear that the rates of compensation are
fixed by the board of supervisors and involve an exercise' of
the independent judgment of that body. A compilation or
the data obtained and consid~red by the commission with its
recomDlendations was transniitted to the board; The, board
thereupon held many he,arings after which these, ordinances
were enacted fixing the rates of compensation pursuant to the
schedule' recommended by 'the commission and amended by
the'board.
The case of Sullivan v. McKinley, 14 Ca1.2d 113 [92 P.2d
892J, relied on by respondent, does not support his contention
that the ordinances here involved are invalid. Irithat case
certain persons employed as car painters by the municipai
railway sought' a writ of mandamus to compel the payment
to them of a rate of wage of $10 a day as provided in the
annual salary ordinance: Payment was resisted on the ground
that a $9 rate of wage had been fixed for them in the budget
and annual appropriation ordinance. In denying a writ this
court held, in, view of' the provisions of section 71 of the
, charter that "All increases in salaries or wages . . . shall be
determined at the time of the preparation of the aniiual budget estimates and the adoption of the annual budget and
appropriation ordinances . . . ," any effort of the board of
s~p~rvisors to increase a wage. scale in the annual salary
ordma~ce over the a~ount provIded in the approved budget
was VOId. It was pomted out that "Once the budget is approved by the Board of Supervisors, the fiscal terms of the
annual' appropriation ordinance and the annual salary ordinance are autom~:ically fixed beyond the power of change by
any amendment. In the present case the increase was timely
and was publis~ed as provided in the charter, thus affording
opport~mty t~ l~tere~te~ parties to object thereto. [4] While
an ordmanc,le IS mvahd If the mandatory prerequisites to its
en.actment are not substantially observed (Sullivan v. MeK~nley, supra, 117; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d ed.,
p. 747, sec. 709), no attack ,is here made on the procedure
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followed by the board itself; and as there ' wassub~iatiti~X',
compliance by the commission with;the procedo/~ ~t~:ps,~?Y::!
erning its action, we do not find It ne~essary .,to",de~e~JD..~ ,
whether th,evalidity of an ordina~ce,ena;ct~~by,:-t~e.bo~r,d;9~
supervisors, could be affected, by l1'l'?b:,-l!ln~l~ :,~~\, ~efe~~i~Rr
the procedure· followed by t~e ~Oni.nil~SlO~~;!!. th~; " ! "'~;.\~~;,\,';1
·.[5a] "There is nothing in tlie,recor~m.~lc.,atm~'~~a~\\~~l~
proceeding is collusive. ' On J Ulle 2~?" ~9,f3,,~all., a~f~~R~~~~~)~Rp'l,il
menced ,in the superi~r, court,?y'a}~aY~J;'~ito,,~:'!l'JBJW,~~;YC',
ment of the compensations provIded mt~e.o~dl~~l!;?~S·ap iq~~~,i
tion. Because of the pendency of tliat aC~l.o~ reSp~ncle~l c9ll:i
troJ.ler refused to audit and approve wagecla1nlsof;~mploy,e~s;
of the municipal railway., Thi~ pro~ee~lin~:bi';~~¥9~~~ii;i~~~
thereupon comm,enced by the CIty and l~~,pubh~'~~W~~,es;,~ott,l.~;,
I;hission. 'The taxJlayer, plaintiff in t~es~Jle~iC?t pq~rl,,( i~le.~!'!r,
pe~ition ,for leave to intervene. u:~'/,Ch" '!D as ;,th~r.e.af~~".'; :fJ(/"~l
drawn. It appears from the petitIon an~ the,~n,s,1'Ve~,1;h~r,~~o;
that a sum of money was appropriated by theb?atp.}>f fl~p~r~j
visors to employ and pay counsel to, represent',r.~pondent
cbntrollerin this proceeding. In his petition t9 'inte&ell~)lte,
ta:xp~yer alleged that the present proce~diiig"'~"ail amic~f:j~~
suit" and was Qrought to "by-pass" hIS supe~lO:t: c~1p1;,act~op.~
Uppn the hearing of this proceeding, h?wever,,;,~he iatto,~et
for the taxpayer declared, "I ~id state lD my prIer ,th.a~~¥.B ' ,
was an amicable suit. I have lIstened to [counsel' forrespon- '
d~nt]and he hasniade, as he always does, a v~r.Y able:pteseil~
tation' of his side of the matter. I have no' desire to disrupt,
the agreed statement of facts in this proceeding,»ht Iwo1l1~i
like an opportunity to present my vie~s so far as they .a:re, ap~'
plicable to this charter. Whether that is done. by th~ couft
grantmg'my application [to intervene] is a m!ltter of indif-:
ference to me so long as I have an opportunity.toprescu~
the legal phase of it, as I see it." After orlllliprcsentiJ1
his views on the issues involved, and receivin~, l'~l'missiont9;,
file a brief" as a friend of the court" , (whi"h brief has been
since filed), he Withdrew, his petition for leave tollitcf\;c~,~::
It is evident from these facts alldthe' contents 0:£ thebrl~~
filed on behalf of the taxpayer that he does' not i'lairn tbis;
proceeding is' collusive.
'
"
,: ' , ' , : : ,
[6] A suit is not condemned by law n;lCre1y because it.i~
friendly (Price v. Sixth Dist",201CaL 502; r;~G 258 ,p.,:}tii'Jf
GOlden Go'te Bridge etc. Disf. v. Felt, 214C31. 308, ~16 [5~;2d,
585]). [ub]'It :s true, of c()ursl!/ that un n.;tiunlf~t,:£o~L~~<t'
.. .
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upon an actllal controversy between the parties to it, but
which is brought for the purpose of securing a determination
of a point of law for the gratification of the curiosity of the
litigants, or the sole object of which is to settle rights of third
persons who are not parties, is collusive and will not be entertained. (Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. v. Felt, §upraj Oollier
v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 644, 645 [266 P. 526]; People v.
Pratt, 30 Cal. 223.) This is not such a case. Respondent, as
a public officer is bound by oath to faithfully perform' and
discharge the duties of his office. He would be acting in violation of his public duty if he authorized payment of claims
that involved an illegal expenditure of public funds. Whether
he could safely approve the payment of these claims depends
upon the validity of the ordinances' authorizing the compensation, and the determination of this question involves a construction of the charter and the application of its provisions
to the facts of this case. His right to approve the payments
had been challenged in a suit. A real controversy therefore
existed as to respondent's duties in the premises.
[7] The fact that the fees of counsel for both sides ultimately must be paid from public funds does not render the
proceeding collusive. It has been held that in litigation involving only private parties and rights, payment of all counsel fees by one party to the litigation may give that party
"such control over both the preparation and argument of the
cause, as to make the suit . .'. collusive . . ." (Gardner v.
Goodyear etc. 00., 131 U.S. Appendix ciii [21 L.Ed.141].)
This does not apply, however, where, as here, the adversary
parties are a municipal corporation and one of its officers.
It is not uncommon for a public official charged with the
aUditing or disbursement of public funds to question expenditures directed by another officer, agency or department of
government. His refusal to audit or pay claims frequently
gives rise to controversies which usually can be settled only by
the judgment of a court. The fact that the opposing parties
are authorized to employ attorneys who are paid from public
funds does not render the suit collusive since the common
sOurce of such payment does not give one party control Over
the preparation and argument of the cause. There is nothing
in the record before us which indicates that the board of
supervisors selected counsel for respondent or exercised any
control over the preparation or presentation of the case on
b(lhalf of respondent. There have been many cases in the
courts of this state involving, public officers similar to the
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present suit in which opposing parties were. represented by
attorneys who were paid from the same pubhc source, yet no
contention was made that the suits were thereby rendered collusive. See Parker v. Riley, I~Cal.2d 83, [113 P.2d 873, 134
A.L.R. 1405] ; Swing v. Riley, 13 Cal.2d 513 [90 P.2d 313] ;
Railroad Oommission v. Riley, 12 Cal.2d 48, [82, r.~d 3941;
Vandegrift v. Riley; 220 Cal. 340 [30 P.2d 51~] ;}leron v.
Riley, 209 Cal. 507 [289 P. 160]; Heckev. R,/,zey~209 Cal.
767 [290 P. 451] ; Stockburger v. ~iley" 21 C.al.App.2d, 165
[68 P.2d 741].) In Golden Ga,te Br~dge etc. D~~t Y."Felt,;21~;
Cal. 308 [5 P.2d 585], the district soug~t ~~~t o~,m~d,a..~~;
to compel F.elt, as s~cretary of the dIstrict s :?,o~~d })~ (~a.tL
rectors, to SIgn certam bonds proposed:tobe~~:sll~dJjY,A~Y
Amici curiae, representing certa,in taxpayers n?tpart;~s .t~~rEl-.!
'in contended that the proceedmg was collUSive. ThlS cour~:
di~posed of the contention as follows: . "It is conced~~ th~t
respondent secretary is personally desl~OU~ of a. dec18lon~
favor of petitioner. In other words, thIS IS, a fr~endly Sl11t..
It appears that the bridge district agre;ed ~o relml;l1~l'Se. respondent for the expense incurred by hIm m, the lItigatIOn,
in the event that the contractors or the bidders for the bonds
or other persons interested did not do s~. . : " T~e~e facts,
amici curiae assert, show that the pro,ceedmg 18 ~ctltlOu~ fl;lld
collusive, being a mere attempt to secure a:t;la~VlSory opmlon,
without an actual contest.... Neither on prmclple nor a~thor- ,
ity does this position commend itself to us. ',' .,Nor IS< the i
fact thathe [respondent] is removable at the pleasUJ;e of the;
board material. . . . A genuine controversy eXisted. . .. Able
counsel were retained to present the case, for respond~~to
this court, and it is not suggested that they '\v,ere l~cking ,m
diligence or good faith in their preparatioll of th~ ,case, Vn,de.~;
these circumstances this court can. properly ~o~I~Elr:~~e;~~~l?o
tion and adjudicate the issues raised. th~rel~, , ' ,':rhe" p'a~ ; les
here were ably representedan~the.ls~:ues:w~re ~ull,y, ;;d~y~e1~
oped and forcefully preseIite~ m eV1den~ go~df~lthl ~nd,}as"
before stated there is no eVidence of COllUSI?n m thiS pro"
d i i d'l
ceeding.
Let a peremptory writ of manda.te .!..ss~e . as, praye. ! 8:ll
pursuant to stipulation of the parties wal:nng:,t~e •.n,gp~ }~,j
petition for rehearing and the statutory;, tlI~~ '~~~~l {~~{.,_
such writ may issue, it is ordered ,th8;t,.sp.c~ pereD?:p~~:g,:~
may issue upon the filing of this ~~CISl~~.,. 1 ,.,;
,,}cq,'t1l't
Shenk, J.,Schauer, J., and Carter,"J;;' cOIicuhed.° 1
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. CURTIS, J.-I dissent. I agree with the conclusion reached
by the. majority opinio:t; upon all questious discussed therein
e:cceptmg that part WhICh holds that this action is not colluSIV~ .. The answer of ~he city and county, filed herein, to the
petIt~on for leave to mtervene in this action. filed by a taxp~yer of the I?unicipality, admits that the board of superVIsors approprIate~ a substantial sum of. money to pay the
att?rney r~prese.ntmg the controller in the defense of this
actI0:t;. ThIs a?tIon, as shown by the majority opinion, is to,
s?Btam an ordmance. of. th? board of supemsors. The plaintiff contends that thIS ordmance isa valid legislative enactm?nt .of the board: The defendant contends that it is,unconstltutIOnal and v.()1d. Th~se admitted facts show conclusively
that the actIon IS collusIve. The majority opinion goes far
be~ond any of the,authorities cited !herein in support.of its
rulmg.

~D~ONDS, '~.,; Dissenting.--I cannot join in a decision'
whIch, m my opmlOn, upholds an ordinance authorizing the
pay~ent of ~ages ~~ncededly larger than the highest amounts,
for like serv!c.es paId, elsewhere in the state, in defiance of:
express prOVISIOns of the city's charter.
. In September, 1942, the Board of S1lpervisorsof San Fran-.'
clsco'ordered. a proposed amendment to section 151 of the"
char~e~, submItted to a vote of the people. Pursuant to the'
provISIOns ,o! .section 183 of the charter, the board then ~uthor-'
~ed the malhpg of a statement to the voters under the head-:
mg: "Standardize Municipal Salaries In Accord With Private Employments. ' Vote Yes." The, reasons for approving'
the propos~d amendment were summarized as follows:
,. "It proVIdes. that municipal salaries shall be in accord with
the g~ner.al prevailing rate in private or other governmental
'
organIZatIOns. '
: ° It' pro~ides for all employees instead of a fa~ored few '
''It p.rovidesfor a minimum salary of $106 p:ermoitth ,for'
a full tIme employee.
"
'.'
:
." It p~ovides for periodic surveys to keep schedules in line
WIth prIvate employment."
.
In
conclusion
the
statement
added:
"We
m'
ust
end
f
't
. . .
• . 'I I .
avorl -,
ISm m m~nlc~pa sa anes. We must put municipal and r'vate salarIes m accord."
p I
~he new section was adopted, at the November election', and '
'
"
ratIfied by the Legislature of 1943.
Prior tO,lits El.mend~ent,section 151. provided that compen-
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sations to be standardized "shall be not higher than prevailing rates for like services and working conditions in pri,:at~
employment or in other comparable governmental organIZations in this state." By the amendment, the w,ords" shall be
in accord with" were substituted for "shall: be, ,not 'higher
than." The reason for the change is clear. Before the' '8.merid~
ment was adopted, the municipal employee had npl'aaS1iriin~~
that he should receive the generally prevailing: wl1ge;tor' the
charter only fixed a maximum limitationbe:y~fi~'~1~:;'~~s
compensation,could not go .. The amendmentr~~~*~ ,t~~~~~~
tationbut, also . ~eclares that. the. ~mpl?y:e,~ sj-~!A}'~~~lt:e ~~,¥~
gener81ly prevailing wage, whIch 18a falrarld l:'!&ctlcaI,staiil:lard from the standpoint of both 'the"employee<1Uid~'tii\f~
'",
',)' <···,:r~."\.:l ~.;I,lr;tl>i~:r~J~~!·iJ:;)
payer.
' i , 'i ' "
.
. . That this is the proper constructiori.'ol'ilii'amendril'etit,
cl~a:l~appears from the arguinen~l,g~riftO't~~,~?~~~~?~7t~
phClt In the statements ~hat theproposed,,~lD.~n,d~~~~, ;rr.~,~
\rides for all employees Instead of a favored few';!' ~na. th8.~
"We must end favoritism in municip81'salariepwetntlst put
municipal and private salaries in accoi:d," is !tl;te' 'fact' lliitt
1luder the provision then existing,prescribing '~hfy') S:,' ip~~L
mum limitation upon the compensationS' ofth~, city's 'etIi~,
ployees, only those in a few. Classificaticin!(;\y&6";recelViH~
that wage and that they were the "'favoredf~w~',!Witlii.Wh6in
the salaries' of the other municipal employees' shi>j11d: be: eqiihl1
ized. Thus the people, in voting for thecharte~amehdlrien~;
w~re informed not only upon the authority 'of':th'e"poard'of
supervisors, ~hich had placed the' measur~ u~on 'the, ballot
"with favorable recommendation," bilt also'byihe'wording
of the proposed amendment, that the,mliiiicipalSalari~ would
be not higher nor lower than, but "inaccord wi~" the rat¢S
prevailing in private employment; 'therebyeriaoIMg'tlie:cit:r/s'
employees to obtain the samecompensation( ~s'tlie 'sbn1etffuJs
more-favored privately-employed workers 'performiilg tHe same
duties.
,"
..
',,,,;,
There is nothing in either the amend'inent~ or ,the reasons
advanced in favor of its adoption, to indicate' that the pur';'
pose of the new provision is to give the employee in public
service an advantage over those privately employed, o~ to
authorize the payment of a larger wage than'the highest paid
by any other employer in the state. The only authority which
the board has to fix a rate of compensationhigher'than that
prevailing in comparable employment is to provide a minimum.

.
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wage in the municipal service of $106 per month. And the
provisiou of the proposed amendment in this regard was one
of the points emphasized in the statement to the voters. With
the exception of this minimum standard, not only would the
allowance to the municipal employee of a greater wage than
that generally prevailing violate the limitation usually found
in municipal charters that the taxpayer shall pay no more
than private industry for the services of its employees, but
it would also be contrary to the procedure of the proposed
amendment, which, as construed by the statement to the
voters, "provides for periodic surveys to keep schedules in
line with private employment." And a court, in interpreting
a charter provision adopted by the voters, should give it a
construction consistent with the general and customary understanding of the words used.
Certainly the amendment was not adopted for the immediate benefit of the municipal street car employees, for they,
a.t the time of the election, were included in the "favored
few" who were already receiving the highest wage then prevailing for like services paid by any street car operator in
the state. In fact, it may fairly be said that the salaries
which they were receiving, prior to the adoption of the amendment, were being paid in violation of the charter. For from
the stipulated facts in this case, it appears that, in recommending ,rates to be paid t,he motormen and conductors of the
municipal railway for the fiscal yeur 1942-43, the Civil Service
Commission knowingly acted contrary to the plain limitation
of the city charter with the acknowledged purpose of avoid-'
ing labor difficulties, as it justified increasing the rates of
these employees to amounts larger than the highest paid elsewhere in the state for like services, upon the ground "that
disruption of transportation service would interfere with production of vital war industries and would also seriously inconvenience a large portion of the population of the community. " And as a further reason for its action, said the
commission, it "is of the opinion that when the provisions
of Section 151 of the charter were drafted by the freeholders
and subsequently adopted by the people, they could not know
of the problems that would be created by the war conditions
which we ~ow face." However, the commission concluded its
. "hll
actIOn
s a not be considered or construed in any sense' as
a precedent in future cases."
Yet despite the clear purport of the amendment to correct
ineqUalities existing because most municipal employees were
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receiving less than the rates prevailing for like s.erv~ces in
, private employment and other governmental org~lZatlOns,. a
majority of this court construe the' amendment asauth01'.lZ~
ing a still higher rate of compensation for the" favored fe'!"
already receiving the highest prevailing rate, and declare that,
because of it, the board of supervisors may now fix a wage
"higher than the generally prevailing rates." I submit that
their conclusion in this regard, and as applied to the facts
of this action, is not justified in law or in fact.
.
The case is decided upon these two issues: (1) Are the
compensations. fixed in the schedule adopted by the board of
supervisors "in. accord with the generally prevailing rates of
wages for like service and working conditions in priv~te .employment or in other comparable governmental orgalllzatl?~S
in this state"; and (2) if so, did the failure'of the CIvil
Service Commission to follow the requirements of the charter
in establishing its recommended schedule of compensations
render the ordinance invalid 7
.
It is conceded that the charter' provision requiring .the
compensation schedule to be "in accord withth~ generally
prevailing rates of wages" is mandatory and that if the .compensations for the municipal railway employees established
by the ordinance under consideration are not so in acc0rd,
the ordinance ,is void. And the majority opinion admits that
"The evidence discloses that the generally prevailing rates of
compensation are somewhere between .70c and 931;2c an hour,
the minimum and maximum rates paid by other transportation systems in the state:" (Italics added.) It also states that
the rates fixed by the board of supervisors range. froin 85c
to 97lhc an hour, but does not break down these figures to
reveal the fact that the proposed municipal wage is five cents
higher than the highest amount paid' by any other operator
of street railway service in the state for comparable classificatio:p.s of employees.
,,
Is, then,. a wage which is five cents an hour higher than
the highest wage paid by any private corporation whose schedule is included in the survey relied upon by the commission,
or which is five cents an hour. lower than the lowest wage
shown, "in accord with" the prevailing wage for such services Y The definitions of "accordance" in Webster's International Dictionary and in Black's Law Dictionary, are quoted
in the majority opinion as meaning in "agreement; h_armony;
concord; conformity." But the majority opinion's addition
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of the word "substantially," when speaking of the measure
of conformity required by the charter, is an acknowledgment
that its conclusion cannot rest upon the language of that
instrument. To so qualify the people's requirement in this
regard is judicial legislation in its plainest form.
'The majority opinion reaches its conclusion as to the
validity of the rates by treating the question as one within
the range of legislative discretion. The legislative determination of what is" in accord with" the prevailing wage is. one
which will. be disturbed, says the majority opinion, only upon
a showing of Itnabuse of authority by the legislative body.
"The courts," it states, "will not interfere with that determination unless the action is f1,'audulent or so palpably
unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law." Such a rule would be applicable if
the only duty of the commission and the board of supervisors
were to fix a "reasonable" salary. (See Graves v. Paducah,
'28 Ky.L.Rep. 576 [89 S.W. 708].) But the charter provision
establishes a definite standard for legislative and administrative action.
None of the authorities in the majority opinion sustains
the, rule for which it is cited. Thus in Mann v. Tracy, 185
CaL 272 [196 P. 484], the petitioner attacked a ruling of
the Civil Service' Commission, made prior to the giving of an
examination, which limited to three years the maximum'
period during which an eligible list' should remain efl:ective.
The court foup.d no charter limitation preventing such action,
and based a decision upholding the action upon a charter
provision allowing the commissioners to strike the name of a
candidate from the list afte:r: ithad been there for more than
two years. And in Hannon v. Madden, 214 Cal. 251 [5 P.2d 4],
the court considered the determination of a city council
upon the question of a contractor's compliance with a street
improvement contract. Not only was there no ,standard or
limitation provided, by the charter or constitution, but a
state law, then provided that "All decisions and determinations of said city council . . . shall be final and conclusive." Under such a statute, said, the court, the decision
of the council upon "such nonjurisdictional matters as the,
failure of 'the work to comply with the contract caI1not be
urged in a court action as grounds for invalidating the
assessment," and it "may be attacked in a legal proceeding
only upon pleading and proof that, the, board acted fraudulently or that its action is so palpably unreasonable and
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arbitrary as to raise an inference of plain abuse of discretion
as a matter of l a w . " ,
. .,' . ,
'
In the only other case cited by the maJorIty' op1ll1?n to
support its statement, th~ action questione~ was the Wlsdom
of the city in entering mto a contract Wlth t~e. county of
Alameda for the latter's care of the former s tubercula;
patients: The court emphasized the fact that no charter ,prov~
sion or statute limited the rj~ht to make such a contract. On
the contrary, said the court, " 'Th~ l~w ~asts upon the boar.d
the dutyaf determining whether m l~S Judgment th~ pu1?I~c
necessity required the county to acqUlre,' a I1ew hO~Pltal ;an.d
,conferred upon it the power necessaI?'" to accomI!hsh: thIS .If
it should so determine. . .. Whetner m th~ exe~c~se, of ,leg~
lative powers the board acts 'Yisely or unWlsel.y ~ ~b" c~ncel'n
'of the courts.''' In the absence of a show~ng. of .,want ! of
jurisdiction or of bad faith, the court contm,!-eCl.~: ,~t ~ould
not'inquire into the question of .whetherthe CIty' had hlade
,a gopd or abad bargain. (In reC'tty and CountY~f:San 'Francisco, 191 Cal. 172, 184, 185 [215 P. 549].) '., " i
'< ",
Unlike the present action where th.e ch.art~r,:cle~tly.~tab
lishes a definite standard for the legiSlatlveluid,i~dIlllIl~s~:~~
tive action,in aU three of these cases there w~,~ ;~o ,e~~s:l:t+
',tional or charter limitation or.stan~ar~.~?yerp;l~~;~r lf~tl~~
'the ejcercise of the area of dIscretIOn ,~t;tv~l~~~;;'i*#~ lRi~~~
section of McQuiUin on MUI1icipal ~orpp~a~~dm~; :~~tt~~ b~ ;~~.e
majority opinion, ;appears the fonoW1~g ~ta!~~~n~ §~ Wei~~e;
ciple : "If the s~lai'~ isfixed1?y tl1 e, ,pJ;'.()~~e~:~~thofl~r,,~n~ ,
in the manner prescrIbed, the genera~:ro/e,:JS thi~~ t~e ,co~s
wiil not interfere.... Usually ~he cO,u~c~ ~r ~~V:~~P,g)~!:ps.
lative body is given power to fix sa~arles 0if.~~~~~lP~~ 9~,C~~
and employees, which is don,e geiler~lly~t o~,41tt,a#c~ (~,1~~~·
'lathieaCt) and not by mere ~esolut~Of1" 9!di~n.'ti~~~J~;o~4WF
for salaries must conform WIth chart~:r,an~ ~~ta!~,~6'ry.:rrp~sions, and canuot provide a salary,less or"gre:!lter"th~p.~llllt
fixed by the charter or statut?s......Wh~~~,.a ,~~!~1J;,lS t;~ h,e
'fixed by, an officer or board It' IS an adml!;11~tr~t~~, e ,net .~~a
need not bc fixed by ordinance." (2 McQUllhl1, on Mllnh!lpal
'Corporations' [2d ed. 1939], sM.~35,'pp'. B03,-~~~.):.,' " ,,\:
,, 'The uharter of a municipality is~t~, co,nst~!utwna1}~, {~?
be valid, an, ordinance mll;st harDi.Olllze WIth:
provi~~0~1~.
,(Marc1tlcscu v. City Planning CO'Ytt., 7 Cal.A:pp~2d 371" ,3Z~
[46 P.2d 308] ; In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. ,71, 8~ 881'. ~70. 1~
Ann.Cas. 911, 11 L.R.A.N.S. 1092]; PLatt v. Swn Frallc,~~~.
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158 Cal. 74, 84 [110 P; 304]; South Pasadena v. [Los Angeles.] J;erminalBy. 00., 109 Cal. 315, 321 [41 P. 1093]:).As
has been aptly stated; "An ordinance. can no mOrechahge- or
limit the effect of the charter .than a statute cmi rnodify or
supersede a provision of the state Constitution." -(Marculescu
V. Oity Rlanning Oofli,., supra, p: 373.) ~nd, in consIdering
a question arising under the San Francisco Charter, this coutt
recently said that "the'provisions of the charter ... muSt
control the actions of the Board of Supervisors and the Civil
.Ser:vi~eComniission· in.det~rmining. the $alary to be ·receiyed"·
by certain. municipal e:IQ.ployees. (Banks v. Oivil Service
Oom., 10 CilL2d 435,438[74 P:2d 741].)
.
Vnder .theprovisiPllB
the charter, the "legislative"
action of the board Of supervisors is pl'edicated UPOn prior'
administrativ13 action by tpe Civil Service Commission, and
,although tb.e procedure established by the charter 'is' cUlminated by the "legislatiye" act of passing an ordinance; the
basic steps in. adopting the ,ordinance are what would' generally be called ' 'administrative" in character. !n. thiS respect
the adoption oftha standardization ordinance is urilikethe
. determination of fact imp'licit in the. a:~tion of a state legis;.
.lature or the federal Congress (see People v. Western Fruit
Growers, ante, p. 494, 597 [140 P . 2d 13] ),but is comparable
to that of legislative and administrative agencies. And it IS.
a rule of universal application that one adversely affected by
such action is ent~tled to a judicial determination' as to
whether any facts exist to support the administrative determination. (South -OhicagoOoal' &; Dock 00. v. Bassett, 309
U.S. 251, 257, 258 [60 S.Ot. 544, 84 L.Ed. 732]; Interstate
Oommerce Oom. V. Union Pac.B. 00.,222 U;S. 541,547, 548
[32 S.Ct.108, 56 L.Ed. 308] ; Northern Pac.B. 00. v. Dept.
of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39,,44, 45 [45 S.Ot. 412, 69 L.Ed.
837]; Booth Fisheries 00. V. Industrial Oom. of Wisconsin,
271 U.S. 208, 209, 210 [46 S.Ct. 491, 70 L.Ed. 908].)
.
Obviously wide latitude must be allowed the commission
in determining what is the' 'generally prevailing; 'wage within the liniitatioI).s of the highest and IQwest amounts paid by
any other employer. But when the .commission has obtained
data showing the highest wage paid, there is no basis for
saying that any greater sum is. "prevailing" and the range
of discretion is at an end; no wage exists with which the
rnunicipal rate may 'be "in agreement" or "conformity."
Consequently no data before the commi~ion' supports the
rates arrived at by it 'and adopted by the board of supervisors.
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For a majority of this .court to refus~ to ,enfor~~th? pla~
language of. the charter in deference to a; determm~tIo~'t?-1
supporte<l by any evidence is: to me, ~~didltion. o,f,8:h. ~Wi1!7
ingn~s to check violation of constitutioIialor ~1i~r~~r. P!-'0:yt~ .
sions... In my opinion, the~lse of the ph~ase, ;"leglsla~~~,,~:.
ctetion,"as applied to ,the f~cts of thL~cas~, .IS_but; an ~t~~.·
mentof judiCial self-abnegatIOn for ,th,e avOldance, of: 11 CO~~l;:
tutional function.
'. .
.'
,,'{,
._; >:~.
And if the .decision of the' majority of this: ,~o~ is,br

:reaiity~b~edupon: t~e. ~rinc~ple't1ia~ ~.~ve-ce~t~~,~:vt~~~o~,
above the' chatter hmltatloncome!,!, wlthlJ;l . the.:p~lJ:l~lp~e, o,~·

dt~mi~frni8nbn.curat ~e:x;, 1 mustftgai~ ~isagr~~/iJ~or;'r~~~'

su~e that the public employee would con~lder. the;p~~tnlt9~ .
a .wage o:f five cents an hour less than We loW~~)~ald,els.e7
where in the state to be of defiIli~e importancet()~ls,standard
of living. Nor is an. excessive wage offiyecen~ an,~ollra
matter too small for judicial cohcern in the 'con$lde~atIOn of
a salary. standardization ordinance fixin~comperisE1ti~nin .an
aggregate amount of$20,OOO,00~ fora,slngle ~sc~,year: '. .
In addition the interpretatIon of the maJonty: opm,lon
'renders uselas's the charter provision as it standard which
.,either the employ~e or the taxpayer may enforce. F.or", by
wh8.t rule is the reviewing court to decide that a compellBatioIi of 10 15. 25. cents or 'more per hour higher than the
highest, or' low~rthan the lOwest, wages paid for, like services
iit private employment is eith?r ~ithjn. or ~ith<?)lt tb,e. per,lnitte:d administr!!tive' and leglslatlve,,~scretloIl Y.' qan It be
fairly said that such .a.result was, <ioritempl~:ed .or. intended
QY the people in adoptmg the chartel' prOVISIOn,? ' _ ,
Aconsideratlon. of the se.cond iss1le ,serveS o~Ylto;eIp.pb,a
size "fhe. accuracy of my conclusion,. t~at the,~pD:l-~~l1sat~oi:ts
'establ~shed by the orq.ina,nce ~renot and we:~~~t~,ten4,eB
to be "in accord with" the generally preva*llg ~at~. ~Il,~
.basic limitation upon the action of the cominisslon in, 9ra,ftiD.~
a Pl'oposed schedUle is that its recommendat~ons ~ust,bemade
"solely on the basis of facts and data obt~~ed In a. co~p:l'.e~:
hensive investigation and survey concermng wages. paId 10
private employment for like service aI,ld working' condjtions
orin .,other governmental org~nizatiomi in this state." To
insure that the commission's consideration be confined t.o ~uch
data the· charter commands, first, that it ,. shall set forth in
the ~fficial· records of its proceedings all of' the data thus
obtained." Secondly, the section requires that" on: the basis of
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such data the commission shall set forth in its official records
an order making its findings as to what is the generally prevailing rate of pay for each class of employment in the municipal service." Finally, it "shallrecommend a rate of pay
for each such classification in accordance therewith. (Italics
added.)
.
The obvious purpose of these limitations is to prevent such
an administrative determination as is now before this court
for review. The charter carefully delineates the scope of the
discretion which the commission may exercise, and limits a
determination by the data, and only the da.ta, of wages paid
by other employers which were before it for consideration;
Alid to safeguard the interests of the municipal employee and
also of the taxpayer, the charter requires the commission to
include in the record of its action both the data considered
and the findings made upon it.
.
In excusing compliance with the charter provisions, the
city attorney insists that the word "shall" is not always to
be construed as mandatory, and although ordinarily having
that meaning, as here used should be held to be directory
only. Under some circumstances, such a construction is permissible, but the test is whether the requirement is of such
importance and materiality to the purpose of the statute
being considered a.s rea.sonably to permit the conclusion that
the Legislatureintended to allow action to be taken only upon
compliance with the specified procedure. In this connection
a court should consider whether an undue advantage is
gained from failure to follow the steps outlined or a benefit
to the public or to an Individual is impaired 9r lost by the
failure to do so. (See Oakev. Oity of Los Angeles, 164 Cal.
705, 710 [130 P. 723].)
Applying these tests to the procedural requirements of sec~
tion 151, supra, it is clear that each is material to the' admittedly rhandatory provision requiring the compensation to be
in accord'With the prevailing rates of wages for similar service.Their importance in confining the action of the commission to tangible data and in establishing a clear record of the
basis of that body's determination, unquestionably operates
to the. advantage of both the public and the affected employee,
for it affords those interested a satisfactory' means of challenging any asserted departure from the standard set by the
charter, both before the board of supervisors, and in, any
judicial review of the action taken. The word ~'shall n there~
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fore should be given its normal connotation, and the proced.'. ,
ural requirements interpreted as mandatory... ,,~
The majority opinion recognizes that, as stipulated by the
parties, the commission .didnot compl!. either with .th~ ;requirement that it set forth in the offiCIal record~ of ,Its ,pro~
ceedings all of the data obtained in its investigatioll,;,or'?t~
the requirement that it set forth ther~i~ "an order making
its findings" as to the. generally prevaIlIng rates. Moreo,:er,
the record of the commission shows that its rec~mmendatlOn
was not based "solely" upon the data which. it considered.
For none of those data included a rate comparable to the
ones contained in the pr'oposed schedule. In. addition, the
.majority opinion admits, the commission based.thesch~~ule
of rates, at least in part, "on changed economIc" condItIOns
reSulting in an increa.sed cost of living." This st~tem~t ~on
forms to the agreement of the parties that the C,O~ISSIOn,
as a basis for its recommendation, "took into consideration
the :fact that since JUly 1, 1942,economic conditions had
changed and the cost of living had increased. " Yet the charter
authorizes the commission or the board <if superviSors to consider changed economic conditions only for the purpose of
determining whether anew survey is necessary to make certain that compensation paid the municipal employees is still .
in accord with that prevailing for like service elsewhere, in
the state, and riot a.s a factual baSis for the computatIon' of
. . . . . ..• '. .' ;,
new rates. (Sec. 151, a.s amended.)
Thus it appears that the commission com~lied Wlt~ non.e
of the three major procedural requirements for ,'t!: 4,etermma~
tion of recommended compensation. Yetdespit(,~is 'fa~t,
and the admissions of noncompliance implicit,~,:¥e~,op~~i?~
of the Chiet Justice and in the agreed sta~emento~Ja~~; J~
is decided that' the action of the comm:issi6ri.;~'co'r\Si!itutl!d· ,Ii
substantial compliance .•. with the. ~!,~~~.d~,~~:,~t~~"s,~~~\~~~7· ,
ated. in section ~51." . And the, dis?~s,s~.~.n.-;ln.~~,~,~~J?~~ .
0l'illlon,uponwhIch thIS conclUSIOn IS pre~c~~ed,;~~~!~~ ~~"#~,
eral and ambiguous for a clear understandmg o! flie m,e~s,~~e
of compliance by the commission with the~eq~re~~~~;.' .. ;".
The stipulation of facts shows tha~ the only 4a~a:~0I1~~~-:
ing the rates of wages paid by' o~her.street' railwa~ :~Pe~ra~
tors in the state, which were consIdered by the, <),ommls$~6D:
in recommending the proposed schedule,'weresetfortll':in\".,
schedule prepared by the Public .AdmiriiStrationr!~etvic~~'''~·
nonprofit organization of Chicago. This schedUleJ4s~' ~~,~~
220.2c1-28
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California communities in which street 'cars or buses are operated and the minimum and maximum rates paid ,by each
operator. Neither this schedule nor the data contained therein was placed in the official records of the commission.
The only schedule which the commission did Include in its
official records was one entitled "Summary of Wage RecommendatioDsand Supporting Data." Except for the then current San' Francisco Muriicipal Railway. rates, this' summary
does not purport to contain or identify the rates of any employer, public or private, nor can it be determined from the
summary what rate of pay was being paid to ally particular
cla!ils of ,employee by any employer other than the city and
~Olintyof San Francisco. Unquestionably, the summary does
not ,contain "all of the data" on the subject of the compensa~
tiOnA here involved which were obtained and used by the COnl7
mission and which the charter requires should be ~et forth
in its official records: This is further emphasized by' the fact
that iri the summary under the heading" Appropriate Pre'vailing Rates'" are !'let forth rates for each of the four'classes
of employees included in the con;tmission's recommendatiori,'
ranging from 80c to 87¥2c per hour. There is ,rio means whatever, based on examining the summary alone, of determining
how such" Appropriate Prevailing Rates" were. arrived.,at,
thus demonstrating that they are based on underlying data
not set forth in the summary or in the official records of the
,
commission's proceedings.,",
And not even a suggestion appears in the stipulated record
that the schedule containing the factual data used by, the
commission was available to public, examination in even unofficial form or that the commission purported to make' an
order including its finding as to the prevailing wage rate.
Under such circums,tances, I see no basis in fact for the con,.
clusion of the majority opinion that "These schedules J:eflected the findings of the commission with respect to preva:ii~
ing wages and constituted a substantial compliance by' the
civil service commission with the procedural steps" of the
charter.
Nor may the result reached in the majority opinion' be
justified by its statement that "the rates of compensation are
fixed by an act of the board of supervisors and involve an
exercise of the independent judgment of that body." For
t.he determination of the board, as well as the commission, is
confined to data which have been considered by the 'Commission, and the same limita.tions apply to the area of discretion

..
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it may leiercise. Section 151, supra, provides that'~'the' civil
service commission shall prepare and submit to 'the, board'
supervisors a:t1d the board shall adopt" the'schedule.pf compensations. The board of supervisors can only adopt)l"'schea~
ule of .compensations "in accord with the gene.1,'aUY,,:~Bre,vai1illg rates of' wages" for like serVices. The" schedules ;recbm~ ,
,mended by the commission "shalr be tran~~itte'di·~b~~·~b1it.~
of supervisors together with the compihi.tion,'of,ii,'sJlmm"iiitybf
.. •
;; I ' t..\.. 1..' \....,.. '.'
the data obtained arid considered by the civil sei-yice,comfu1s~
sion and a comparison showing existing schedules.'~,In'adCU~
tion, the charter requires that, "before making any amendment" to the schedule of compensations recommended by the
commission, "the data. considered by the. board. .o(s;upervisors
shall be transmitted to the civil service cottilhissloD: ifor review
and analysis." Such provisions clearly show th't ;·tl1efboard,
in adopting the schedule, is limited to specific data:C<>nSidered
by the commission, and that the board's deterfuinatioh,; as
well as 'the commission's, must also be supported' bY' 'such
evidence.
'
:'< '
If democracy is to continue to mean a governniJilt ()fJa~,
then, as was said at an earlier time, "no argument. of hardship wiil justify a court in setting at naugh~, ~4e, w:rittell
thec;lty's
terms of a city's charter, even at the instance,
officials." (San Christina Investment Co. v. San :1!rancisco,
167 Cal. 762 [141 P. 384, 52 t,R.A;N.S. 676] .)And"as 1 '
pohitedout in City and County of San Francisco V. Linares,
16Ca1.2d 441, 448 [106 P.2d 639], certainly this should not
be done in a suit between the city and one of its' administrative officers, for it allows a question of public interest to be
conclusively decided in a proceeding which is' not brought in
such form as to allow a full and fair judicial examination' of
the merits of the controversy. Especially is this true where,
as in the present' proceeding, the city official~, purportedly
adverse toone another on the issues presented, have waived
in advance 'the right to apply fora rehearing .. Moreover,the
city attorney has admitted that the board of, supervisors
appropriated the money to pay the fees of counsel 'who are
appearing for the respondent city controller. The United
StateS Supreme Court very recently dismissed an action insti.
tuted as a "friendly suit." Characterizing it as collusive,
the, court said : "Even in a litigation where only private
rights are involved, the judgment will not be aJlowed to stand
where one of the parties has dominated· the couduct of the
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suit by payment of the fees of both." '. (UnitedStatesv.JohnU.S. 302 [6aS.Ct. 1075, 87'L.Ed. _].)
For these reasons, in my opinion, the writ of mandate
should be denied.
.'

son, 319

j'

TRA. YNOR, J., Dissenting.-It seems to me clear that the
ordinance under review was adopted jnvio~ation of the provisions of the city charter. I cannot agree, however with
Justices Ourtis and Edmonds that this is' a collu.siv~ proceeding.

(8. F.No. 16896. In Bank. Aug 13, 1943.1.
In re EDWARD E. GEHRING, on Disbarment.
[1] Attorneys - Reinstatement -When Reinstatement Will Be

Denied.-An application for readmission to practice law after
disbarment was denied where, after having read' the Rules of
Procedure of The State Bar, petitioner failed to include in
his petition a statement concerning his arrest or prosecution
for any crime following his disbarment, as required by rule
3?, /!lubd. (3). (i), and where such failure was not justified by
hIS explanatIOn that the criminal charges were dismissed or
that the ;proceedings were dropped. Such conduct showed
that the applicant either sought to conceal material' facts from
the committee appointed to investigate him or lacked that
high quality of intellectual discernment and' integrity which
is required of attorneys at law.
PETITION for reinstatement as an attorney at law. Peti'
tion denied.

,

Ii

;1 "

Gardiner Johnson and A. W. Carlson forPetitioner~
,"

Ben Aiken, Jr., and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent.
THE COURT.-Petitioner seeks reinstatement as an attorney at law. He was disbarred by order of this court on November 1, 1932, made upon recommendation of the Board of
Governors of The State Bar, approximately twenty-seven
[1] Reinstatement of disbarred attorneys, note, 48 A.L.R. '1236.
See, also, Deal.Jur. Te,n-year SuPP. 477; 5 Am.Jur.443.
Mclt. Dig. Reference:' [1] Attorneys, § 181.
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years after his admission to practice. No review of the board's
decision was sought at that time; The grounds 'for the disbar:,
ment were that petitioner admittedly commingled certain
estate funds with funds of his own and converted a portion
of the estate funds to his own use. The disbarment record_
also discloses two companion proceedings in which suspension
was - recommended on the ground that petitioner received
attorney ~s fees and costs in two separate divorcerilatters' but
failed to file suit or to return the money in either, instance;
Petitioner, now approximately 68 years' of age; practiced
law in Alameda County, and has continued to reside there
since he was disbarred. The S,tateBarLocal A:dfuin~strati:ve
Committee of that county, appointed bytheBoardo'tGove:f~
nors to investigate, hear evidence,' and makefindmgs' in!'con.i.
ilection with petitioner is 'applicationfOi'r~adriii~i6il;"!I:~1
ported that by reason of his failure to include it\hii{petItiori
certain information required by rule 39' of the Rules ofPro~ ,
cedure of- The State Bar, they felt thatpetitioner'hlidnot
acted in good faith in sUbmitting'the petition. Oonsequently
they. recommended against reinstating him. A minority' report, with favorable recommendation, was also presented.
. After a further hearing before the Board of Governors, ,that
body voted nine to four against recommending that petitioner
be readmitted. Petitioner now seeks. a rev:iew by this' court
and an order of readmission notwithstanding theadv:erserecommen dation. The record, however, impels us to the conchi"
sion that the position of the examining committee and~he
Board of Governors, is well taken and that the , petition' for
reinstatement should be denied.
.
.
[1] Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure of The State :Bsr
requires that a petition for reinstatement shall contain, among
other things, Cf (3) . . . (i) a statement, for the pel:'iod of
rehabilitation, showing dates, general natUre' and ttItimate
disposition of every matter involviiig' the arrest' or 'prose<lution of petitioner for any crime, whether felony or' misdE!~
meanor . . . ; (j) a statement stating whether! or ::hotany
applications were made during 'said period' for a licenSe requiringproofof, good character for its procurement ..• ,
and·the disposition thereof."
"
',.'
-As first J)resented to The State Bar for fUing,~'petitidrier;'s'
petition contained no statement as to "whether, or nbtH:durmg
the period following his d~sbarment he]laditppne:d):eo¥l"t
iiceilse "requiring proof of go6d clJ,aracter'for'ftIFproi3tire-::"
ment." He was informed that hispetitiori '&ould!1i5Fb~(me(F
until this omission was supplied. Either on this occasion' or

;,

